Abstract-The increasing popularity of online social network brings huge privacy threat for the end users. While existing work focus on inferring sensitive attributes from the social network such as age, location and gender, little has been done on how to protect the users' privacy by preventing the malicious inference. On the other hand, the social network provider relies on sharing the social data for profit. In this paper we investigated the vulnerability of the existing social network sharing model and designed a privacy-preserving framework. We evaluated the framework's privacy and usefulness guarantees, demonstrated its effectiveness on classification and the defense against the privacy attack.
INTRODUCTION
U SER-generated social media data are exploding. Twitter, the most popular microblogging service, generates 500 million tweets per day by 320 million monthly active users as of December 2015. Facebook, the largest online social network with about 1 billion daily active users as of June 2015, generates 4 new petabytes of data per day. People use social media platforms to communicate with their friends, share their daily life experiences, express their opinions on political/social events and commercial products, etc.
Closely tied to human beings in the physical world, largescale social media data have tremendous usages by various data consumers and have become one of the most profitable resources for social media service providers [1] . For example, companies use the data to learn the behavior of their customers, monitor the public responses to their products, deliver online advertisements more cost-effectively, and uncover the trends that may impact their businesses; public policy makers explore the data to obtain the demographic information for making strategic decisions; public health agencies analyze the data to identify and predict disease outbreaks; and sociologists leverage the data to study the social behavior and establish new social network theories. In a typical social media mining application, the data consumer demands a set of users and their social media data (such as profiles, recent posts, and friends), which satisfy some desirable criterion. For example, company A may request the data of all the users who mentioned the company name in the past week after a public relation crisis.
The disclosure of complete and intact social media data exacerbates the threats to user privacy. For example, many users mention their vacation plans in publicly visible tweets without knowing that criminals can exploit such information for targeted break-ins and thefts [2] . Criminals may identify potential victims nearby by directly browsing/searching social media platforms, and smarter ones can explore the search APIs offered by social media platforms. The data acquired in this traditional way are only small and random samples of all the qualifying data. For example, Twitter claims that their Search API only "searches against a sampling of recent tweets published in the past 7 days" [3] . If the criminals could access the complete and intact social media data in the target area, they (e-mail: jxzhang@asu.edu).
can identify all potential victims to plan large-scale break-ins. In addition, social media mining applications are increasingly sophisticated and powerful. If complete and intact social media data are available, lots of sensitive information the users do not explicitly disclose could still be inferred, such as age [4] , [5] , location [6] , [7] , language [8] , and political preferences [9] .
There is a natural conflict between data utility and user privacy in social media data publishing. On the one hand, data consumers want complete and intact social media data to maximize the data utility, which is also the most profitable case to social media service providers. The maximum data utility is achieved unfortunately at the biggest sacrifice of user privacy. On the other hand, social media service providers are also motivated to protect user privacy due to legal concerns, public relations, and many other reasons. For example, they may intentionally add random noise to the data before releasing them to data consumers. User privacy is thus better protected but at the loss of data utility.
A growing body of work studies privacy-preserving publishing of social graphs and falls into two directions. The first line of research [10] - [12] aims at vertex privacy by publishing social graphs with anonymous user IDs, and the research effort is to prevent the adversary from linking anonymous IDs to corresponding users in the real social network. The other line of research targets link privacy [13] , [14] , and the main effort is to publish social graphs with real user IDs but perturbed links by deleting some real edges and adding some fake ones. Neither line of work considers the privacy of user data and thus cannot be directly applied in our context.
In this paper, we propose a framework for privacypreserving social media data publishing. The framework consists of a data service provider (DSP), numerous social media users, and a lot of data consumers. The DSP can be either a social media service provider itself such as Twitter or Facebook, or a third-party data company such as Gnip and DataSift which resells the data obtained from social media service providers. Data consumers can be an arbitrary individual or entity in public or private sectors. They are interested in statistical information that can be mined from social media data, rather than real user IDs. A data consumer submits a data request to the DSP, which specifies the query conditions. The DSP responds with a data set satisfying the query conditions, in which each user ID is anonymized.
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Although there can be various attacks on social media data publishing, we consider a user-linkage attack as the first effort along this line. In this attack, a malicious data consumer attempts to link random or selected anonymous IDs in the received data set to real IDs on the social media platform, so he can obtain the latest social media data about the victims or other sensitive information not covered by his previous query. We assume that existing sophisticated techniques such as [10] - [14] are adopted to preserve both link privacy and vertex privacy in the anonymized data set, so the attacker cannot uncover real IDs based on either vertexes or edges. Our focus is to perturb user-generated data such that they cannot be exploited for the user-linkage attack.
It is very challenging to design effective defenses against the user-linkage attack while achieving high data utility. First, social media data are highly unstructured and noisy. Specifically, unlike traditional documental content, social media data are composed of a large mount of short and informal posts. For example, each tweet allows at most 140 characters. So users tend to use slang and abbreviations to express their feelings and opinions, such as "u have a gr8 day" meaning "you have a great day." This phenomenon makes traditional privacypreserving techniques on structured databases inefficient [15] . Second, social media data are extremely large in quantity and contain a lot of redundancy. For example, many users have intensive interactions with their friends in the forms or replies and retweets, or they may post many tweets on a single topic. Finally, different data consumers may have diverse social media mining applications with totally different utility functions, so the data they request from the DSP may differ significantly in variety and/or quantity. So it is almost impossible for the DSP to adopt a universal mechanism to preserve the same level of user privacy while satisfying the utility requirements of various data consumers.
Our defense against the user-linkage attack in this paper consists of three steps. First, we map the complete and intact data of all the users into a high-dimensional user-keyword matrix. Second, we add controlled noise to the user-keyword matrix to satisfy differential privacy [16] , the most popular privacy model lately. Finally, the perturbed user-keyword matrix is disclosed to the data consumer, where each user ID is anonymized. If the social graph corresponding to the data set is also needed, existing defenses such as [10] - [14] should be adopted to preserve both link privacy and vertex privacy. Our defense applies to a wide range of social media applications. For example, the data consumer can infer demographic information about the target population from the perturbed data set.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows.
• We are the first to coin the problem of privacypreserving social media data publishing to the best of our knowledge, for which a system model is also proposed.
• We propose a novel mechanism to guarantee differential user privacy while maintaining high data utility in social media data publishing. The popular Laplacian mechanism to achieve differential privacy suffers from the curse of dimensionality [17] and can bring huge noise to the original dataset which significantly reduces data utility. We define a new metric called -text indistinguishability whereby to design a mechanism to break the constraint of the Laplacian mechanism. Fig. 1 : Social media data publishing. The data consumer submits a query to request the data of everyone who tweeted the keyword "SuperSunscreen" in the past 48 hours. The data service provider then return all the qualifying users with anonymous IDs and their recent 1,000 posts.
• We thoroughly evaluate the proposed defense on a realworld dataset with regard to user privacy and data utility. Our results show that high-level privacy protection can be achieved without significantly sacrificing data utility. For example, we show that our mechnism can reduce the privacy leakage by as much as 64.1% by reducing only 1.61% of utility in terms of classification accuracy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the problem statement. Section 3 illustrates our design for differentially privacy-preserving social media publishing. Section 4 evaluates the utility and privacy aspects of our mechanism by detailed experiments. Section 5 surveys the related work. Section 6 concludes the paper.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we first describe the system model for social media data publishing, followed by the adversary model. Next, we briefly argue that current publishing policies of major social media service providers are vulnerable under our adversary model. Finally, we state the design objectives.
Social Media Data Publishing
We consider a system with three parties: social media users, social media data service providers, and social media data consumers, as shown in Fig. 1 .
• Social media users use the social media to connect with their friends and/or ones they have followed and generate the original texts which could be set either private or public. Public users are searchable either directly via the social media service provider's website or APIs or from the external tool such as Google. By setting his/her profile private, a private user only allows the authenticated users to access the profile and is not searchable from other users. However, the social media service provider still has full access to all the private and public data per user agreements.
• The social media data service provider (or DSP for short) hosts and provides most likely paid access to social media data. A DSP can be a social media service provider such as Twitter or Facebook itself. It can also be an emerging third-party data company such as Gnip or DataSift, which partners with social media service providers to provide social media data services. For example, Gnip and DataSift both have authorized access to Twitter's Firehost engine whereby to have access to complete, intact, and realtime Twitter data. The DSP can publish the data according to the privacy policies and agreements (detailed in Section 2.3) which users consent to when signing up for using social media services. Generally, the DSP has full rights to use all the hosted data for their businesses and also share the data with data consumers. For example, the DSP can sample the whole user space according to data consumers' requests, assign an anonymous ID to each sampled user, process the original data from each user according to data requests, and finally deliver the processed data to data consumers.
• Data consumers purchase social media data from the DSP whereby to run various social media mining algorithms to extract useful information. A data consumer can be an individual, a business, a government agency, a research institution, or any other entity in public and private sectors who is aware of the growing importance of social media data. A data consumer typically sends to the DSP a request specifying its query conditions, pays for the request, and then receives the data. For example, company A may request the data of all the users in the west coast who have tweeted the keyword "company A" in the past week. After receiving the data from the DSP, it can explore advanced social media mining algorithms to identify critical market trends and analyze the users' demographic information such as age, location, education level, income level, marital status, occupation, religion, and family size.
We emphasize that a data consumer currently cannot obtain complete and intact social media data without the DSP's support. For example, social media service providers publish public APIs which allow a data consumer to crawl their platforms, but data crawling via public APIs has critical limitations that hinder the retrieval of complete data in need. First, each API call only returns a random and small sample of the whole data satisfying the query conditions. Second, such public APIs often have a rate limit on how many queries a data consumer can run in a particular time period. For example, Twitter users can make 180 requests/queries per 15 minutes to get others' timelines [18] . Finally, a nontrivial set of users (e.g., 11 .84% for Twitter [19] and 52.8% for Facebook [20] ) set their data private such that unauthorized data consumers have no way to search for and obtain these private data. As a result, the data consumer needs to request the complete data in need from the DSP who has the complete dataset.
Adversary Model (User-Linkage Attack)
The DSP is assumed to be fully trusted by both social media users and data consumers. On the one hand, social media data are increasingly important profit venues of social media service providers. For example, it is reported that data licensing has already account for more than 10% of Twitter's total revenue. So the DSP is motivated to provide high-utility data services to data consumers. On the other hand, the DSP is obligated to protect the privacy of social media users due to legal concerns, public relations, and many other reasons. The framework we propose allow the DSP to strike a good balance between data utility and user privacy.
Some advanced social media users may be privacy-aware and have taken some actions to protect their privacy. For example, the statistics in [19] and [20] show that 11.84% of Twitter users and 52.8% of Facebook users set their accounts private, respectively. As said, the DSP still has access to the complete data despite the users' privacy settings. In addition, the users' effort to protect their privacy fails in the presence of the attack outlined below.
Our focus is to defend against the user-linkage attack, which can be launched by a curious or even malicious data consumer. Assume that the DSP has anonymized every user ID in the dataset and also taken existing defenses such as [10] - [14] to guarantee link and vertex privacy. There are two possible versions of the user-linkage attack. In the first version, the attacker locates some target users by random browsing or searching via public APIs on the social media platform. It knows that these users must be in the received dataset under anonymous IDs. Existing defenses only consider link and vertex privacy via various obfuscation mechanisms, and no attention has been paid to text data. Armed with the text data of the target users with real IDs, the attacker can easily locate the corresponding anonymous IDs in the dataset. In the same way, the attacker can link the real IDs of the initial target users's friends to the corresponding anonymized IDs, and so on. The attacker eventually can uncover all the mappings between real and anonymous IDs in the dataset, despite the DSP's anonymization effort even based on existing advanced defenses [10] - [12] . In the second version, the attacker tries to learn more information beyond the received dataset. It starts by finding some interesting posts/tweets in the anonymized dataset and then easily locating the real users by performing simple text matching on the social network platform. Once the real users are located, the attacker can learn their latest information and even other information the attacker's original query does not cover.
To highlight the danger posed by such user-linkage attacks, assume that the attacker is an intelligent criminal. He first sends a query for all the users in a target physical region who tweeted "vacation" in the past month. Then he locates valuable targets in the anonymized dataset by running sophisticated social media mining algorithms. Next, he uses the user-linkage attack to find out the real IDs of these valuable targets and track their realtime statuses on the social media platform. Finally, the attacker can well plan break-ins and thefts aiming the victims who mentioned future vacation plans. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to notice and study the defense against such text-based user-linkage attacks which can be extremely dangerous.
Vulnerability of Current Social Media Data Publishing Policies
Social media data and their sharing policies are critical for the business of social media service providers. The typical business model is that users can use social media services for free, but in return they have to allow social media service providers to fully access, record, use, and profit from their public/private data. In this section, we review the current data publishing policies of Facebook and Twitter, two representative social media service providers and further highlight the need for privacy-preserving social media data publishing. Note that we have absolutely no intention to compare/critize/judge these data publishing policies which are in effect for various technical and non-technical reasons.
In particular, Facebook 1 claims that "We want our advertising to be as relevant and interesting as the other information you find on our Services. With this in mind, we use all of the information we have about you to show you relevant ads," and "We transfer information to vendors, service providers, and other partners who globally support our business, such as providing technical infrastructure services, analyzing how our Services are used, measuring the effectiveness of ads and services, providing customer service, facilitating payments, or conducting academic research and surveys." Similarly, Twitter 2 allows third-party data consumers to access both the private and public user data, as they claimed "We engage service providers to perform functions and provide services to us in the United States, Ireland, and other countries. We may share your private personal information with such service providers subject to obligations consistent with this Privacy Policy and any other appropriate confidentiality and security measures, and on the condition that the third parties use your private personal data only on our behalf and pursuant to our instructions." These publishing policies are obviously subject to the aforementioned user-linkage attack, regardless of whether advanced defenses such as [13] , [14] are incorporated to protect link and vertex privacy.
Design Objectives
We consider the following problem within the aforementioned social media data publishing framework. After receiving a data query from the data consumer, the DSP searches the entire social media database to generate a dataset D, which contains all the users satisfying the query and their published texts (e.g., tweets, retweets, and replies) during the period specified in the query. Each user in D is assigned an anonymous ID to provide baseline user privacy. The data consumer may also request the social graph associated with D, in which case we assume that existing defenses such as [10] - [14] are adopted to preserve link and vertex privacy such that it is infeasible to link an anonymous ID to the real user based on his/her vertex's graphical property in the social graph. Our focus is to let the DSP transform the raw dataset D into a new one D by perturbing the user texts according to the following three requirements.
• Completeness: each data item in D can be mapped to a unique item in D , and vice versa. In other words, no user is added to or deleted from D to create D .
• Privacy Preservation: The user texts in D can be used to link any anonymous ID in D to the corresponding real user ID with negligible probability. This means that text-based user-linkage attacks can be thwarted with overwhelming probability.
• High Utility: D and D should lead to comparable data utility at the data consumer when conducting common 1 . https://www.facebook.com/policy.php 2. https://twitter.com/privacy?lang=en data mining tasks such as statistical aggregation, clustering, and classification.
DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVACY-PRESERVING SOCIAL MEDIA DATA PUBLISHING
In this section, we present a novel technique to achieve differentially privacy-preserving social media data publishing with the aforementioned design goals in mind. Inspired by geo-indistinguishability from [21] , which is proposed to protect location privacy, we propose a novel notion of textindistinguishability as the foundation of our technique. In what follows, we introduce the background on text modelling Section 3.1 and differential privacy in Section 3.2. We then present the concept of text-indistinguishability in Section 3.3, followed by our technique in Section 3.4. A working example is subsequently given in Fig. 3.5 . Finally, we theoretically analyze our technique in Section 3.6 and make some remarks in Section 3.7.
Text Modeling
As stated before, social media service providers such as Facebook and Twitter currently publish the original data set D to the data consumer, which contains the complete and intact user texts. We assume that there are n users in D, each assigned an anonymous ID. There are two obvious drawbacks for this publishing method. First, although this method can enable the maximum data utility, it is vulnerable to the text-based userlinkage attack. Second, the data consumer cannot directly use the original texts which are highly unstructured and noisy, as mentioned in Section . For example, common machine learning algorithms such as SVM and K-means require the input for each user to be a vector. Therefore, from the perspectives of both privacy protection and data usability, the DSP needs to transform each user's texts into a numerical vector. Here we introduce text modeling, a standard process to achieve this goal.
We first remove stop words in a stop-word list, 3 in which the words such as "the" and "those" are considered more general and meaningless. Then we conduct stemming [22] to reduce inflected words to their stem forms such that the words with different forms can be related to the same word. For example, "play", "playing", and "played" are all reduced to "play".
Next, we represent the keyword space for the cleansed texts using a τ -gram technique, which is widely used for statistical text analysis. The τ -gram technique splits a give message into sequences of τ contiguous words, each referred to as a τ -gram with τ ranging from 1 to the message length. For example, consider a tweet {"#SuperSunscreen is really useful, and I like its smell"}. After removing stop words and performing stemming, we have {"supersunscreen really useful like smell"}. The corresponding 1-grams are {"supersunscreen", "really", "useful", "like", "smell"}, and the corresponding 2-grams are {"supersunscreen really", "really useful", " useful like", "like smell"}. We let N i denote the τ -grams of X i for each user i ∈ [1, n] for all possible values of τ . Then we choose the top m most frequent τ -grams in 1≤i≤n N i , each of which is referred to as a keyword hereafter.
Finally, we use Term Frequency Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) [23] to derive each element D i,j in the eventual dataset. Specifically, let Γ(j) be the number of times a 3 . http://www.lextek.com/manuals/onix/ τ -gram j appears in the τ -gram list N i of user i, Γ * i = max j∈Ni Γ(j), and Γ (j) denote the number of users whose τ -gram lists contain j. We define
) .
The above normalization is necessary because the users normally have very different tweet sets and thus different τ -gram lists. Interested readers are referred to [23] for more details about TF-IDF. We abuse the notation by letting D = [D i,j ] ∈ R n×m denote the dataset after text modeling as well, which is essentially an n × m user-keyword matrix. We also let U i := D i,1 , . . . , D i,m denote the text vector of user i (i ∈ [1, n]), i.e., the ith row in D.
It is a common practice to use 1-grams and 2-grams only for high computational efficiency without significantly sacrificing the analysis accuracy. So the keyword space and user-keyword matrix can be constructed very quickly in practice. Also note that the DSP needs to publish the τ −gram name of each column. Otherwise, the data consumer has no idea about the physical meaning of the released data.
Why Differential Privacy?
The text model above has two important implications. First, it makes the unstructured social media data structured by reducing the keyword dimension from unlimited to m. Second, since the keyword space is composed of the top m most frequent τ -grams, the users' privacy has been largely improved in contrast to the original intact text data. For example, when a user has a tweet saying "The last class with students at CSE561, #MIT", the word "CSE561" or even "MIT" has very low probability to be selected in the keyword space. Therefore, this critical information has been hidden by the text modeling process. The privacy threat, however, cannot be completely eliminated. For instance, the 1-grams such as "last", "class", and "student" may still be released. These pieces of information can at least tell that the user is a professor or teacher. By combining other text information such as "computer" and "software," the attacker can further link the target user to a college professor teaching computer science. Such inferences can be continued until the target is linked to one or a few real IDs on the social media platform.
Differential privacy is a powerful technique to protect such linkage attacks. Proposed by Dwork et al. [16] , [24] , differential privacy protects the individual user's privacy during the statistical query over a database. If each user in the database is independent, 4 with any side information except the target him/herself, the attacker cannot infer whether the target user is in the database or which record is associated with him/her [25] . Providing arguably the strongest analytical protection for user privacy, the differential privacy model can be more formally defined as follows, which is tailored for our social media data publishing framework.
Definition 1 ( -Differential Privacy [16] ). Given a query function f (D) with an input dataset D ∈ R n×m and a desirable output range, a mechanism K(·) with an output range R satisfiesdifferential privacy iff
4. The dependence among the users will hurt the privacy guarantee as indicated in [25] , [26] .
for
Here is called the privacy budget. Large (e.g. 10) results in large e and indicates that the DSP can tolerate large output difference and hence large privacy loss (because the adversary can infer the change of the database according to the large change of the query function f (·). By comparison, small (e.g., 0.1, e 0.1 = 1.1052) indicates that the DSP can tolerate small privacy loss.
Differential privacy models can be interactive and noninteractive. Assume that the data consumer intends to execute a number of statistical queries on the same dataset. In the interactive model, the data consumer submits to the DSP the conditions for constructing the dataset D and also a desirable statistical query function f . Instead of returning D to the user, the DSP only responds with K(f (D)), where K(·) perturbs the query result. In contrast, the DSP in the non-interactive model designs a mechanism K(·) to transform the original dataset D into a new dataset D = K(f (D)). Finally, D is returned to the data consumer which can execute arbitrary statistical queries locally.
-Text Indistinguishability: a New Notion
Our problem can be formulated according to a non-interactive differential privacy model as follows. Let us use an identity query f I (·) as the query function such that f (D) = D. Our goal is to find a mechanism K(·) to transform the original userkeyword matrix (or dataset) D into a new one D = K(D) such that -differential privacy can be achieved. Instead of transforming the entire dataset D as a whole, a more straightforward approach is to perform the transformation for each row individually, i.e., adding noise to each row U i ∈ D to produce a new row U i ∈ D . The Curse of Dimensionality. The Laplacian mechanism [16] is a popular technique for providing -differential privacy, but it suffers from the curse of dimensionality. To see it more clearly, recall that -differential privacy is defined over the query function f and unrelated to the dataset because Eq. (2) holds for all possible datasets. What matters is the maximum difference between f (D 1 ) and f (D 2 ) (∀D 1 , D 2 ∈ R n×m ), which is called the sensitivity of the query function f defined as follows,
For the identity query f I (·) which transforms each text vector (row) in D to a new vector in D , the sensitivity can be furthered defined as
where U i ∈ R m and U j ∈ R m are any two arbitrary vectors based on TF-IDF (see Eq. 1).
The Laplacian mechanism can achieve -differential privacy by adding the Laplacian noise to the query result [16] , i.e.,
where Y ij are drawn i.i.d. from Lap(S(f I )/ ) ∝ e − |x|/S(f I ) . The Laplacian mechanism unfortunately decreases the utility of the transformed dataset. Specifically, the larger the dimension m from the output of the identity query function f I (·), the larger the sensitivity S(f I ), the larger deviation of the Laplacian noise. Moreover, the large noise accumulated from the high dimension will be added to each single element of K Lp (f I (U )), leading to the so-called curse of dimensionality. Specifically, from the definition of the text vector U i in Eq. (1), the norm of each element in U i should be less than log(n)(≈ 11.5 when n = 100000). When the dimension m (e.g., 10000) is large enough, the added Laplacian noise has deviation O(m), which can easily exceed the norm of original text element (≈ 11.5).
-Text Indistinguishability. The root cause of the curse of dimensionality is that the noise added to a single element in every text vector U i (∀i ∈ [1, n]) is proportional with the L 1 -sensitivity of U i . To tackle this problem, we need to limit the sensitivity of the whole text vector to the norm of the vector, instead of the individual element.
To begin with, we need to generalize the concept of differential privacy defined in Definition 1. The generalization of differential privacy was first proposed by Andrés et al. for location privacy [21] , where the privacy budget is proportional to the physical distance between any two users. They also propose the concept of geo-indistinguishability such that the service provider reports similar distribution with the difference bounded by e d(loc1,loc2) for any two users at locations loc 1 and loc 2 , respectively. Inspired by this work, we let d(U i , U j ) denote the Euclidean distance between U i and U j , which are any pair of text vectors in the user-keyword matrix D. We further redefine the privacy budget as d(U i , U j ) and propose the notion of -text indistinguishability as follows.
Definition 2 ( -Text Indistinguishability). Given the userkeyword matrix
where U i and U j are any user text vector pair in D, and U * is a text vector in perturbed user-keyword matrix D .
The above definition means that any two vectors U i and U j in D can be transformed (or perturbed) by the mechanism K t (·) into the same vector in D with probability ≥ e − d(Ui,Uj ) . In other words, the more similar two text vectors are, the more non-distinguishable they are after transformation, and vice versa. The maximum privacy budget is given by r max , where r max denotes the maximum Euclidean distance between two text vectors in D. As in the original -differential privacy mechanism, the larger the privacy budget, the larger the privacy loss the DSP can tolerate, and vice versa. The following theorem gives the upper bound of r max , based on which the DSP can select to ensure an acceptable privacy budget.
Theorem 1. Given the user-keyword matrix D ∈ R
n×m built according to Eq. (1), the maximum Euclidean distance between two text vectors is r max ≤ √ m log(n).
Proof. According to the definition in Eq. (1), a text vector U has the maximum norm √ m log(n) when each of its element is equal to the maximum value log(n). It follows that r max ≤
The upper bound above is almost unreachable in practice, as it requires that all the m keywords be used by only one user. So r max in practical scenarios is far less than √ m log(n). But if the DSP chooses according to √ m log(n), the effective privacy budget for many text-vector pairs is actually very small, implying that these text-vector pairs are very likely to be indistinguishable after perturbation.
Achieving -Text Indistinguishability
In this section, we propose a mechanism to achieve the -text indistinguishability. To this end, we first assume r max to be infinite and then finite.
Mechanism for Infinite r max
The mechanism K t (f I (·)), designed for the identity query f I (·), maps each text vector U ∈ R m of the dataset D to a new U with the same dimension m. To that end, we write the perturbed U as:
where d is a random variable indicating the Euclidean distance between U and U , and Θ is an m-dimensional random vector drawn from the m-dimensional unit hypersphere. The mechanism is then composed of two steps: the generation of the magnitude and the direction. Since the drawing of Θ is straightforward, we focus on generating d. Similar to the Laplacian mechanism [16] , we let d deviate from the center U according to the Laplacian distribution,
where d ranges from zero to infinity. It is easy to check that
The CDF above tells us how to generate a random d. Specifically, given a user text vector U , we want to generate a perturbed vector which has at most d Euclidean distance from U . Since d follows the PDF defined in Eq. (8), given a random probability p ∈ [0, 1], we can obtain
We now show that the proposed mechanism satisfies -text indistinguishability.
Theorem 2. The mechanism K t (f I (·)) defined above achieves the -text indistinguishability.
Proof. Given two user text vectors U i and U j , the probability quotient of being perturbed the same vector U * can be computed as
Here Θ 1 and Θ 2 can be canceled because both are drawn from the m-dimensional unit hypersphere with the same probability, and the inequity holds because of the triangle inequity. Therefore, the conclusion holds.
Mechanism for Limited r max
The mechanism K t (f I (·)) in last section maps the user text vector U to U with potentially infinite distance. However, we have demonstrated in Theorem 3.3 that any text vector pair have the Euclidean distance bounded by r max . Here we present how to truncate the mapping into a specific r max . We denote the corresponding mechanism as K r (f I (·)).
As we can see from Fig. 2 , C (d = r) will approach to one quickly as r increases. Therefore, we define a tolerance parameter γ to indicate how much of CDF will be outside r max . In other words,
The algorithm of K r (f I (·)) is listed in Alg. 1. Given the tolerance parameter γ and r max , we compute the according to Eq. 11 in Line 1. Then for each U i in the dataset D, we draw the noise vector dΘ by two steps: (1) obtain the magnitude randomly in Line 3 by using r = C −1 (p) where p is the random CDF, and (2) compute the direction Θ in Line 4 by drawing a random vector from the unit m-dimensional hypersphere. Line 5 adds the noise to U to get U . 
We also show that the mechanism K r (f I (·)) achieves the -text indistinguishability.
Theorem 3. The mechanism K r (f I (·)) defined above achieves the -text indistinguishability within r max .
Proof. For each text vector U , with the probability of 1 − γ, the perturbed text vector U has the Euclidean distance less or equal to r max from U . The rest steps follow the proof of Theorem 2, and the conclusion holds. Fig. 3 gives a simple example for our system operations. Here the data consumer wants to find the users who have posted about a sunscreen product "SuperSunscreen". The DSP finds three qualified users with tweets as "Use #SuperSunscreen with mom, very useful", "Cheated after using #SuperSunscree ", and "Great #SuperSunscree!", respectively. The first step is to remove the stop words, conduct the stemming, and then compute the TF-IDF matrix defined by Eq. 1. We obtain the 1-gram lists for these three users as "use(2), SuperSunscreen, mom", "cheat, use, SuperSunscreen", and "great SuperSunscreen", respectively. Consider the 1-grams keyword space as "use, SuperSunscreen, mom, cheat, great", we can build the TF-IDF matrix D as follows. The DSP then release D and the keyword space to the data consumer for machine learning tasks. As we can see, the perturbed matrix largely reduce the distance between each user text vector by sacrificing little utility. We will evaluate the tradeoff between the privacy and utility later.
A Working Example
D =   U 1 U 2 U 3   =  
Performance Analysis

Privacy budget
As shown in Eq. (11), , which is the constant scale of the privacy budget d, can be determined by γ and r max , as shown in Fig. 4 . As we can see, for r max from 1 to 10 4 and γ from 1 to 10 −16 , is always less than 2. Moreover, since is reversely proportional to r max , the whole privacy budget d is less than − log(γ) (because d ≤ r max ), which is relatively small. The small privacy budget is critical for differential privacy mechanisms because a large budget result in a large privacy loss.
Break the Curse of Dimensionality
As stated in Section 3.3, the original -differential privacy notion and the corresponding Laplacian mechanism suffer the curse of dimensionality for perturbing the text vector. The reason is that the noise strength added to each element in the text vector has a scale of S(f I )/ , where S(f I ) is the L 1 sensitivity of the text vector and proportional to the dimension m. We now estimate the scale of the noise strength for the mechanism K r (f I (·)).
Theorem 4.
Given a text vector U ∈ R m , by applying the mechanism K r (f I (·)), the expected noise strength for each element in U is unrelated to the dimension m.
Proof. According to Eq. (9), we can obtain
1 − p dp = 1 2 . Combining Eq. (11) and the upper bound of r max in Theorem 3.3, we can obtain
Here E(d) is the expected noise strength for the whole vector U . Therefore, the expected strength for each element in U is
which is unrelated to the dimension m.
Moreover, by setting the γ to extremely small (e.g., 10 −16 ), the upper bound approaches 1. Note that according to Theorem 3.3, this upper bound is rather loose. Therefore, the expected noise strength for each element is far less.
(α, δ)-usefulness
The mechanism K r (f I (·)) also satisfies (α, δ)-usefulness defined by [27] .
Definition 3 ((α, δ)-usefulness).
A -text indistinguishability mechanism K satisfies (α, δ)-usefulness iff for every user text vector U , with the probability at least δ, the perturbed text vector U satisfies d ≤ α.
Theorem 5.
The mechanism K r (f I (·)) defined above achieves the (α, δ)-usefulness.
Proof. It can be easily seen according to the CDF of the random variable d in Eq. (8).
Remarks
We have three remarks to make on our design.
First, the proposed -text indistinguishability and K r (f I (·)) mechanism can be used to protect the privacy in other contexts as long as the dataset D is homogeneous, meaning that each column should have a similar numerical range. The reason is that the model generalizes and represents the whole vector by its L 2 norm, while ignoring the difference for each element in the vector. If the element in each row vector is different, the generalization could become meaningless. Nevertheless, the proposed mechanism break the curse of dimensionality, and it is an interesting topic to extend the proposed model to heterogenous datasets.
Second, the mechanism in Alg. 1 could generate a perturbed vector with very large norm (> r max ). However, the attacker cannot obtain any external information from this abnormality. The reason is that the probability for any user who has this abnormality is random. Moreover, the probability is negligible. For example, when r max = 100 nd γ = 10 −8 , the probability of abnormality is 10 −8 . In general, the less γ, the less the abnormality, and vice versa.
Third, r max is important for our mechanism, and we can further reduce r max by clustering to define the (k, )-text indistinguishability. Specifically, we can partition the dataset into k clusters by grouping the close vectors in a cluster, and then conduct the -text indistinguishability independently within each cluster. Since each local group has a smaller r max , less noise is added to the original dataset, leading to higher data usability. Obviously, the larger the K, the less the privacy and the higher the usefulness, and vise versa. 
EVALUATION
In this section, we use both a real-world dataset and simulations to evaluate the proposed -text indistinguishability mechanism K r (f I (·)) in three aspects: the privacy and usefulness, the utility on a typical machine learning task, and the defense against the user-linkage attacks.
Dataset
As stated before, the data consumer aims to use the social media data to do the demographics analysis. Here we use a ground truth Twitter user dataset with known age information similar to [5] . Specifically, a user A has age x if one of his friends has posted a tweet with the format "Happy xbirthday to A". We used Twitter Streaming API to monitor these tweets and the ground-truth users. We then manually check the consistency between the claimed age information and the tweets they have posted to. Finally, we found 5,710 users, which consist of 2,855 users who are at least and less than 25 years old, respectively. We crawled one year of their recent tweets and obtained 3,363,706 tweets. We then removed the stopping words and conducted the stemming as stated in Section 3.1, and built the TF-IDF matrix according to Eq. (1) for the following experiments. Because of the randomness during the noise generation, we run each of the experiment 100 times and report the average results.
Privacy and Usefulness
We first check r max in the real-world dataset above. To start with, Fig. 5 shows the loose upper bound with different dimension m stated in Theorem 3.3. We set the number of users n = 5710. The upper bound is a sublinear function with m, and increases from 200 to 1000 when m ranges from 1000 to 10000.
We also measure r max in the dataset as shown in Fig. 6 . Specifically, we compute r max as the maximum L 2 norm of each row vector from the dataset D. As we can see, although the r max increases sublinearly with m, the magnitude is much less than the upper bound in Fig. 5 . The reason is twofold. First, because we built the TF-IDF dataset by choosing the most m frequent grams, the IDF term in Eq. ( 1) is much less than log(n). Second, the TF part is less than √ m because the text vector is sparse (each user has only used limited grams when m is large).
Given r max , Fig. 6 demonstrates the expected noise strength added for each single element in the text vector. As we can see, the noise strength is fairly stable with the dimension m, which is consistent with Theorem 4. Moreover, the expected noise strength ranges from 0.02 to 0.03, and is comparable to the original data. Therefore, the proposed mechanism can tolerate an arbitrary dimension, i.e., breaking the curse of dimensionality. Fig. 7a and Fig. 7b show the (α, δ)usefulness of the mechanism at different r max and γ, respectively. As we can see, with probability δ, the distance between the original text vector and the perturbed vector is within α, which verifies Theorem 5.
Performance on Classification
We evaluate the mechanism on classification, one of the typical applications from the machine learning community. As stated before, each user has the ground-truth age information. We can then build a binary classifier to determine whether a user is younger than 25 years old or not. We use the Support Vector Machine (SVM) [28] algorithm to evaluate the classification performance on both the original and the perturbed datasets by ten-fold cross validation. Fig. 8a demonstrate the accuracy with a changing γ. The straight and crooked lines represent the original and perturbed datasets, respectively. As we can see, the smaller γ, the higher the performance for the perturbation mechanism. This result is not surprising. Specifically, Theorem 4 indicates that the 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
The number of disclosed keywords smaller γ, the less the noise added to the original dataset. However, small γ will increase the privacy budget scale and hence the privacy loss. Fig. 8b demonstrates the accuracy of the original dataset (straight line) and the perturbed datasets with different r max (crooked curves). As we can see, the smaller r max , the better the accuracy because smaller r max will incur less noise. However, less noise will cause a high privacy loss because the attacker can infer the victim given the huge difference between two perturbed vectors. Fig. 8c and Fig. 8d show the classification performance on m = 5000. As we can see, both figures show the similar trend for m = 1000, meaning that the mechanism works well at various dimensions. Moreover, the performance when m = 5000 is slightly better than that when m = 1000. The reason is that more keywords lead to better classification.
Defense Against User-Linkage Attacks
Our mechanism is designed to defend against the user-linkage attack. The definition of -text indistinguishability in Definition 2 and the corresponding mechanism in Alg. 1 show that any user can be perturbed to other text vector with certain probability. Therefore, the perturbation can make the user-linkage attack more difficult to conduct. To evaluate the effectiveness of our mechanism, we need to model the strength of the attacker in terms of user inference. We consider two attack models here.
In inference attack I, we assume that the attack knows t elements of the victim's text vector, and t vary from 0 to m. We then build an estimated vector U by keeping these t elements and setting other unknown elements to zero, and check whether the estimated vector U is in the K-nearest vector set in both the original D and the perturbed D . It is expected that the larger the t, the stronger the attack, the higher the inference rate. We set m = 1000 and γ = 10 −8 . We conduct the experiment by 1000 times and report the average results. Fig. 9 shows the inference rate among the 1-nearest and 10-nearest vectors for r max = 100 and 200. We can make two observations. First, all the four curves show that the perturbation algorithm makes the user linkage attack much more difficult. Specifically, when the t increase from 300 to 600, the inference rate increase quickly from 0 to 100% for the original dataset. The inference rate then stay at approximate 100% when t is larger than 600. By comparison, the inference rate for the perturbed dataset is at most 68.8% for r max = 100 (K = 10) and 44.6% for r max = 200 (K = 10), respectively. Second, Fig. 9 demonstrate the tradeoff between the privacy and usefulness in terms of r max . Specifically, on the one hand, the mechanism's inference rate for r max = 200 is less than the rate for r max = 100. The reason is that larger r max results in larger noise and hence higher-level privacy protection. On the other hand, larger r max results in lower classification performance as indicated in Fig. 8 . The tradeoff also holds in terms of γ.
Moreover, users' privacy has not largely sacrifice the utility. For example, as a typical setting, when r max = 100 and γ = 10 −8 , the inference rate with t = 600 and K = 10 is 35.9%, and the classification accuracy is reduced by only 1.61%. Therefore, the proposed mechanism can achieve high privacy guarantee with little utility loss.
In inference attack II, we assume that the attack knows the noisy but the whole text vector of the victim. To that end, we randomly select a victim vector U * from D, add a noise vector N with the magnitude s where 1/s is the attack strength, and then check whether the noisy vectorŨ = U * + N is in the K-nearest vector set in both the original D and the perturbed D . We use the Euclidean distance to represent the difference between any vector pair. Obviously, it is expected that the weaker the attack strength, the higher the inference rate. Fig. 10 show the inference rate among the 1-nearest and 10-nearest vectors for r max = 100 and 200. We can make the similar observations as in the inference attack I. First, the perturbation algorithm makes the user linkage attack much more difficult. Specifically, when the reverse attack strength s increases, the inference rate for the perturbed dataset decreases to about 30% for K = 1 and 40% for K = 10, meaning that the attacker has limited power to infer the victim. By comparison, the inference rate for the original dataset is always 100% when s is less than 17. The reason is each user text vector is very distinguishable. When s > 17, the inference for the original dataset decreases dramatically because the measured r max for this dataset is 15.1 for m = 1000, as indicated in Fig. 6 . Second, Fig. 9 demonstrate the tradeoff between the privacy and usefulness in terms of r max , and users' privacy has not largely sacrifice the utility. For example, as a typical setting, when r max = 100 and γ = 10 −8 , the inference rate with s = 15 and K = 10 is 47.7%, and the classification accuracy is reduced by only 1.61%.
Note that there is a peak point for the inference rate on the perturbed dataset in Fig. 10 . This is because that the perturbation also adds the noise vector in the similar way as in the inference attack II. For different r max , the perturbed vectors have different Euclidean distance from the original vectors. Recall that U andŨ are the perturbed vector and the estimated vector from the attacker for the victim U * , respectively. When the difference between d(U * ,Ũ ) and d(U * , U ) is small, the inference rate will increase. However, in reality, the attacker has little knowledge on the whole text vector for the victim. Therefore, it is difficult for them to conduct this type of inference.
RELATED WORK
This section reviews the most relevant work.
Privacy on Social Media Platforms
Social media platforms host the network and also text information. The privacy threat of both pieces of information has been studied widely. For the privacy threat from the network information, existing results show that an anonymous social graph can be de-anonymized by seed information [29] , [30] and community structures in the social graph [31] . As for the privacy threat from text information, sophisticated machine learning algorithms can be used to infer a lot of sensitive information, such as age [4] , [5] , location [6] , [7] , language [8] , and political preference [9] .
On the defense side, the research community only attempts to protect user privacy from the perspective of network information. The research efforts fall into two directions. The first line of research [10] - [12] aims at protecting vertex privacy by publishing social graphs with anonymized user IDs, and the research effort is to prevent the adversary from linking anonymized IDs to corresponding real IDs in the real social network. The other line of research targets link/edge privacy, and the research effort is to publish social graphs with real user IDs but perturbed edges by publishing an obfuscated social network to protect users' privacy [13] , [14] . Our paper is the first to protect the privacy from the text information and is complementary to these efforts. Some other work protects the social media users' privacy from the architectural aspect. For example, Cristofaro et al. proposed the Hammingbird [32] to replace the Twitter system, and Papadopoulos et al. proposed a K-subscription system to protect the user's privacy in Twitter [33] . However, although these systems have strong privacy guarantee, they might be difficult to be widely adopted in practice.
Differential Privacy
Privacy-preserving data publishing has been thoroughly studied and surveyed in [15] . The majority of work surveyed in [15] focuses on the traditional database instead of the unstructured social media data.
In this paper, we adopt the non-interactive differential privacy model with completeness, which has been studied in [34] for differentially-private PCA and in [35] for differentially private compressive sensing. However, the first work cannot be used for the nonnegative text analysis or the samedimension perturbation, and the second cannot defend against the user-linkage attack. There are other non-interactive differential privacy mechanisms such as [36] and [37] . However, they cannot guaranteed the completeness of the one-on-one mapping. Differential privacy has also been applied in many other applications, such as location [21] , [26] , compressive sensing [35] , and health data [38] .
Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning
Also related is privacy-preserving machine learning [39] , [40] . These schemes use a different system model where the users are distributed entities and have the control on how to share their data. We use a different system model where all the end users share their social media data with the trusted data service provider. Moreover, these schemes are designed for specific machine learning algorithms, while our framework targets more general data mining applications.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the vulnerability of the existing social media data publishing model and also designed the first privacy-preserving publishing framework. We pointed out that the existing -differential privacy and the popular Laplacian mechanism suffers from the curse of dimensionality and makes the perturbed data useless. We then proposed the -text indistinguishability and designed a mechanism to achieve it. We evaluated the mechanism's privacy and usefulness guarantees, as well as its high effectiveness on classification and strong defense against the user-linkage attack.
